Abstract: Broadly speaking, economists have studied trust in two somewhat distinct ways. One approach is best captured by notions of generalized trust; another approach places trust at the core of relational contracts. After reviewing two empirical approaches to the study of relational contracts, we provide a preliminary attempt to bridge these two strands of the literature in the context of Rwanda’s coffee supply chain.

Abstract: There is a consensus that global value chains have aided developing countries' growth. This essay highlights the governance complexities arising from participating in such chains, drawing from lessons we have learned conducting research in the coffee and garment supply chains. Market power of international buyers can lead to inefficiently low wages, prices, quality standards, and poor working conditions. At the same time, some degree of market power might be needed to sustain long-term supply relationships that are beneficial in a world with incomplete contracts. We discuss how buyers' market power and long-term supply relationships interact and how these relationships at the export-gate could be leveraged to enhance sustainability in the domestic part of the chains. We hope that the lessons learned by combining detailed data and contextual knowledge in two specific chains—coffee and garments—have broader applicability to other global value chains.

Abstract: This article reviews an emerging body of evidence on relational contracts, defined as informal arrangements sustained by the value of future interactions. We focus on developing and international markets, which are often characterized as contexts with weak formal contract enforcement. We introduce relational contracting between firms as a governance form alternative to both firms and markets. We then review evidence on the prevalence of long-term relationships between firms and discuss why this governance form might be particularly common in developing countries. After introducing a simple framework, we discuss the measurement of relational contracting between firms. We review an approach that takes dynamic incentive compatibility constraints to the data to quantify the value of future interactions and illustrate how different types of shocks can be used to uncover the inner functioning of relational contracting. We also review structural models and conclude with policy implications and promising avenues for future research.

Abstract: Food value chains (FVCs) in developing countries are transforming rapidly, with some regions in the modern stage (led by supermarkets and large processors) and other regions in a transitional stage (led by midstream small and medium enterprises). With transformation, however, come market-performance issues related to monopoly and monopsony power, vertical bargaining, contracting, and other issues addressed by empirical industrial organization (EIO) researchers. Although the concepts and methods of EIO are evolving rapidly, the two bodies of literature on EIO and FVC transformation as part of the food markets and food industries branches of development economics have not sufficiently cross-pollinated. Applying tools of modern EIO to FVCs in developing countries is now relevant because of the transformation that has occurred and possibly due to the increasing availability of data from surveys of farms, processors, and wholesalers, and for some retailers, from scanner data. We review the transformation trends, the EIO themes and tools relevant to them, and the emerging data sources.

An in-progress collaboration with Julia Cajal-Grossi (IHEID).